

Inequality, Credit Access and Growth: Models & Evidence

ECGA 6470: Economic Growth Development

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Lecture notes Spring 2015


Inequality and Growth: Theory

- **Redistributive Political Economy:**
 - **Rent-Seeking** behavior-- corruption protection
 - **Fiscal channel-- redistribution** via taxes, government policy-- poor median voter for opts for high taxes & transfers reducing overall growth
- **Capital Market Imperfections: (Aghion)** credit constraints imply more equal asset distribution leads to more investment in human capital
- **Political & Social instability: segregation** reduces investment in public goods (ghettos) as well as lead to crime & violence
- **Savings Rates:** Keynes, Kaldor, Lewis & Pasinetti thought inequality raised average savings rates...

Classical – Kuznet's curve growth raises inequality early in the development process


- Growth begins unevenly, savings derive from profits (Arthur Lewis) and a large supply of unskilled labor discourages.
- The the economy reaches a “Lewis turning point” when real wages start to rise and inequality begins to decrease -- this is Kuznet's “U hypothesis”
- Inequality creates an incentive for investment in human and physical capital-- high profits associated with Inada conditions & low real wages... up until the Lewis turning point

Classical View– Kuznet's curve Inequality rises early falls later... (rural becomes urban




Barro, 2008 find's some evidence along these lines,
but much stronger for low income economies

Figure 1: A Kuznets Curve: Effect of per capita GDP on Gini Coefficient



Barro, 2008 find's some evidence inequality reduces growth, especially in low income economies



Figure 2: Effect of Income Inequality on Economic Growth



This graph corresponds to the regression system in Table 4, column 2. The curve shows the partial relation between the growth rate of per capita GDP and the Gini coefficient, holding fixed the estimated effects of the explanatory variables other than the Gini coefficient. (The variable on the vertical axis has been normalized to have a mean of zero.)


Barro, 2008 find's evidence inequality reduces growth, especially in low income economies

Figure 3: Effects of Income Inequality on Economic Growth: Two Ranges of per capita GDP



“New IMF” view – Inequality slows growth... especially with imperfect credit markets

Figure 1a. The Hills of Growth
(Real GDP per capita)




Source: Penn World Tables Version 6.2

Note: Real GDP per capita is measured in logs, so a straight line implies a constant growth rate.

Newer views– Inequality slows growth... especially with imperfect credit markets (Berg et al., 2011 and

Figure 3. Effect of Increase of Different Factors on Growth Spell Duration




Sources: Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2008) and authors' calculations.

Note: For each variable, the height of the figure shows the percentage increase in spell duration resulting from an increase in that variable from the 50th to the 60th percentile, with other variables at the 50th percentile. For trade, the figure shows the benefits of having an open instead of a closed regime, using the Wacziarg and Welch (2008) dichotomous variable. For autocracy, the figure shows the effects of a move from a rating of 1 (the 50th percentile) to 0 (the 73rd percentile.)

Newer views— Inequality slows growth... especially with imperfect credit markets ([Berg & Ostry, 2011](#))

Figure 2. Duration of Growth Spells and Inequality



Source: Penn World Tables and Wider World Income Inequality Database.

Note: This figure includes spells that end in-sample (completed spells) only, because the length of incomplete spells is unknown. For this figure, minimum spell length is five years.

Newer views– Inequality slows growth... especially

Table 2. Characteristics of Growth Spells

Region	Frequency and duration					Average growth before, during, and After ¹			
	No. of countries	No. of spells	Mean duration (years)	% spells lasting at least		Average growth			3 y Before
				10 years	16 years	Before	During	After	
Complete spells									
Advanced countries ²	37	2	13.0	100.0	0.0	3.3	6.0	1.2	2.6
Emerging Asia	22	3	18.0	33.3	33.3	-0.7	9.1	1.4	1.4
Latin America	18	5	14.4	60.0	40.0	1.1	4.8	0.2	1.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	43	3	8.3	0.0	0.0	-2.7	9.9	-4.0	-10.6
Other developing ³	20	7	10.7	42.9	14.3	-1.6	5.0	-0.9	-1.4
Total (including incomplete spells)									
Advanced countries ²	37	11	24.4	100.0	63.6	0.7	5.7	n.a.	-0.1
Emerging Asia	22	16	24.2	87.5	56.2	-0.3	5.8	n.a.	0.4
Latin America	18	7	15.7	71.4	42.9	0.4	4.4	n.a.	0.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	43	18	13.6	66.7	22.2	-4.0	6.3	n.a.	-7.7
Other developing ³	20	12	13.5	66.7	33.3	-2.1	5.0	n.a.	-2.8

Source: Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2008) and authors' calculations.

Note: A growth spell is a period between a growth upbreak and a growth downbreak, as long as per capita real growth is at least 2 percent during the spell and falls to below 2 percent after the downbreak. Breaks are at least eight years apart.





¹Real per capita GDP growth, in percentage points.

²Includes Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China.

³Caribbean countries, Cyprus, Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey.

Figure 1b. The Hills, Valleys, and Plateaus of Growth
(Real GDP per capita)

Newer views—
Inequality slows growth... especially with imperfect credit markets ([Berg & Ostry, 2011](#))



Sources: Penn World Tables Version 6.2, Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2008), and authors' calculations.
Note: Vertical dashed lines represent statistically significant growth downturns; solid lines represent statistically significant upbreaks. Real GDP per capita is measured in logs, so a straight line implies a constant growth rate.

Fiscal Transfers key?

- **Alesina and Rodrik (1994) public investment financed by taxation of capital income-- .**
- **Bertola (1991) revenues from taxation redistributed directly to the poor. Voting outcome depends on capital labor share-- higher the wealth/income of the median voter the higher the growth rate.**
- **Persson and Tabellini (1994) redistribution from rich to poor, higher taxation discourages investment in human capital-- poor the median voter relative to the average the higher the tax rate and the lower growth and investment.**

Evidence on the Fiscal View

- **Problematic and higher transfers tend to be associated with higher growth-causality may be reversed as in the classic theory.**
- **But many studies find no relation, or a positive impact of transfers on growth... see Benabou Table in A&H on page 294.**

Political Instability and Growth

- **Assassinations, attempted coups, strikes have a negative effect on growth-- but what causes political instability-- a small middle class?, lack of education?, inequality?-- lack of democracy?**
- **Table 5 in Alesina and Perrotti (1994) : Political instability reduces investment, instability is caused by lack of middle class and level of GDP.**
- **Rodrik (1998) finds inequality and lack of democracy reduces government's ability to respond to negative external shocks (crises).**

Asset Distribution & Growth

- **Deininger & Olinto (2000) “Asset Distribution, inequality and growth?” World Bank, find initial asset distribution, as measured by land inequality, negatively affects subsequent growth.**
- **Education limited by inequality, if education increases overall economic less inequality increases economic growth Interaction between asset inequality and growth is negative and significant.**
- **D&O (2000) find income equality has a positive effect on growth... the opposite of Forbes...**
- **Asset inequality is hard to reverse— reform, privatizations...**

See [Penalosa lecture notes](#) (including Piketty) for a update of her JEL survey
[Aghion Caroli & Garcia-Penalosa](#)

Journal of Economic Literature
Vol. XXXVII (December 1999), pp. 1615–1660

Inequality and Economic Growth:
The Perspective of the New
Growth Theories

Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli, and Cecilia García-Peñalosa.¹

TABLE 1
THE IMPACT OF INCOME INEQUALITY ON GROWTH

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
	GR	GR	MTax
Constant	-0.18 (-1.37)	0.004 (0.47)	0.164 (1.13)
GDP	-0.002 (-1.77)	-0.004 (-2.39)	-0.021 (-1.50)
MSec	0.031 (4.05)	0.004 (0.38)	
FSec	-0.025 (-3.06)	0.001 (0.10)	
PPPI	-0.002 (-0.30)	-0.0005 (-0.07)	
MID	0.118 (2.84)		-0.096 (-0.19)
MTax		0.090 (3.61)	
N.Obs.	67	49	49
R ²	0.30	0.22	0.30
Estimation	OLS	2SLS	2SLS

**Empirical Evidence:
Bigger middle class
enhances growth
(median voters)**

Source: Perotti (1996), Table 4, p. 160, and Table 8, p. 170.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The variables are GR: average rate of growth of per capita GDP 1960–85; GDP: per capita GDP 1960; MSec: average years of secondary schooling in the male population; FSec: average years of secondary schooling in the female population; PPPI: purchasing power parity value of the investment deflator relative to the US in 1960; MID: combined income share of the third and fourth quintile; MTax: average marginal tax rate over the period 1970–85.

If credit markets are imperfect, inequality reduces growth, if credit markets work, inequality is less of a problem (reason to Bank the World) & forgive Greece's debt?

The main conclusion we can draw from this section is that when we allow for heterogeneity among agents along with capital market imperfections, the traditional argument that inequality has a positive impact on growth is strongly challenged.” page 32 of Philippe Aghion Jeffrey G. Williamson (1999) Growth, Inequality, and Globalization Theory, History, and Policy [Chapter 1](http://class.povertylectures.com/AghionWilliamson.pdf). <http://class.povertylectures.com/AghionWilliamson.pdf>

Aghion and Williamson, 1999

The basic incentive argument carries over to the aggregate economy when agents are identical and/or capital markets are perfect (see Rebelo 1991). Consider the neoclassical Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth model. Infinitely lived agents maximize their intertemporal utility subject to their budget constraint. Each agent then solves the problem

$$\max_{c_t} \int_0^{\infty} u(c_t) e^{-\rho t} dt$$

$$\text{subject to } w_t + r_t k_t = c_t,$$

where ρ is the intertemporal discount rate, w_t the net wage, k_t the capital stock or wealth of the individual, c_t consumption, and r_t

the *after-tax* interest rate. Solving this program we obtain the optimal rate of growth of individual consumption as a function of the after-tax real interest rate

$$g = \frac{r - \rho}{\sigma},$$

where $\sigma = -u''(c)c/u'(c)$ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.

There is only one good in the economy that serves both as a *capital* and *consumption* good. There is a continuum of overlapping-generations families, indexed by $i \in [0,1]$. Each individual lives for two periods. The intertemporal utility of an individual i born at date t is given by

$$U_t^i = \ln c_t^i + \rho \cdot \ln d_t^i, \quad (1)$$

where c_t^i and d_t^i denote current and future consumption respectively. Individuals differ in their initial endowments of human capital. Let the endowment of individual i upon birth at date t be given by

[Aghion and Williamson, 1999](#)

$$w_t^i = \epsilon_t^i \cdot A_t,$$

where ϵ_t^i is an identically and independently distributed random shock that measures individual i 's access to general knowledge. We normalize the mean of ϵ_t^i at one, so that $\int_0^1 w_t^i di = A_t$

Individual i can either use the efficiency units of labor he is endowed with in order to produce the *current* consumption good, according to a linear “one-for-one” technology, or invest it into the production of the future consumption good. Production of the future consumption good (i.e., of the good

available at date $(t + 1)$) takes place at date t according to the AK technology

$$y_t^i = (k_t^i)^\alpha (A_t)^{1-\alpha}, \quad (2)$$

where k_t^i denotes the amount of investment by individual i at date t , A_t is the average level of human capital or knowledge available in period t , and $0 < \alpha < 1$.

[Aghion and Williamson, 1999](#)

Aghion and Williamson, 1999

We assume that the economy exhibits learning-by-doing: the more an economy produces in one period, the more it learns, and hence the greater the level of knowledge available in the next period. Formally

$$A_t = \int_0^1 y_{t-1}^i di = y_{t-1}. \quad (3)$$

That is, the accumulation of knowledge results from past production activities.

Aghion and Williamson, 1999

The rate of growth between period $t-1$ and t is given by:

$$g_t = \ln \frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}}$$

that is

$$g_t = \ln \int_0^1 \left(\frac{k_t^i}{A_t} \right)^\alpha di,$$

where k_t^i is determined by intertemporal optimization. It then can be expressed simply as

$$g_t = \ln \frac{E_t(k^\alpha)}{A_t^\alpha},$$

where $E_t(k^\alpha)$ is the mathematical expectation over the output generated by individual investment levels k at date t .

Aghion and Williamson, 1999

Consider the extreme situation in which borrowing is simply not possible and agents are constrained by their wealth, $k_t^i \leq w_t^i$. In this case, individual investments are simply a constant fraction of their wealth $k_t^i = s \cdot w_t^i$. Thus, in contrast to the perfect capital-market case, when credit is unavailable equilibrium investments will differ across individuals (being an increasing function of their initial endowments in human capital), and the rate of growth is given by the distribution of endowments

$$g_t = \alpha \ln s + \ln \int_0^1 (\epsilon_t^i)^\alpha di.$$

More inequality is therefore bad for growth when capital markets are highly imperfect.

Aghion and Williamson, 1999

Consider a lump-sum transfer policy which consists of taxing highly endowed individuals directly on their endowments, and then using the revenues from this tax in order to subsidize human-capital improvements by the less endowed. Thus, the post-tax endowment of individual i can be simply defined by

$$\hat{w}_t^i = w_t^i + \beta(A - w_t^i), \quad 0 < \beta < 1. \quad (4)$$

[Aghion and Williamson, 1999](#) or [Penalosa, 2015](#)

The rate of growth becomes:


$$g = \alpha \ln s + \ln \int_0^1 (\epsilon_t^i + \beta(1 - \epsilon_t^i))^\alpha di. \quad (5)$$

Now consider the term under the integral sign. As β increases, the heterogeneity among individual investment levels (which are proportional to $[\epsilon_t^i + \beta(1 - \epsilon_t^i)]$) decreases, and therefore so does the aggregate efficiency loss due to the unequal distribution of w^i . In the limiting case where $\beta = 1$, the term under the integral sign is constant across individuals i , and the highest possible growth rate is achieved.

inequality reduces $E(k_i) = y$ & growth

output and invest for HH

Figure 7: HH Solow model




Why does lower output (due to inequality) imply lower future growth?

Answer: learning by doing such that $A_t = y_{t-1}$

This implies $y_t / y_{t-1} = E(k)^\alpha$

Access to credit matters because it is an imperfect alternative to redistribution for further discussion see Aghion and Bolton, 1997 and/or [Penalosa's lecture notes](#)

Empirical Evidence: financial access reduces inequality?
Source: World Bank, re-thinking the role of the state in finance, 2013, page 20



Source: Update of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007.

Note: The Gini coefficient is on a scale from 0 (total equality) to 1 (maximum inequality). The chart is a partial scatter plot, visually representing the regression of changes in the Gini coefficient between 1960 and 2005 on the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio (logarithm, 1960–2005 average), controlling for the initial (1960) Gini coefficient. Variables on both axes are residuals. The abbreviations next to some of the observations are the three-letter country codes as defined by the International Organization for Standardization.

Democracy, inequality and Growth:

Most evidence shows democracy has no strong growth impact (not harmful?)

but Rodrik (1997) argues democracy:

- 1. leads to more “predictable” long run growth**
- 2. more stable growth rates, less severe collapses**
- 3. leads to better responses to bad luck (negative external shocks). Democracies pay higher wages?**

Barro (1997) Investment & Democracy

- **Barro (1997) Chapt. 2 (cites land reform as growth retarding..) positive coefficient on linear term, negative in squared term.. Low levels of democracy growth enhancing, higher levels reduce investment..**
- **Optimal democracy index is about .5 – about Mexico/Malaysia's level implies that Chile, South Korea and Taiwan who went from .2 to .3 in the 1970s and then to .7 or .8 then in the early 1980s got worse ? (check this)...**

Barro (1997) Lipset Hypothesis: causality runs from Income to democracy

- **Democracy is more likely as income, education and life expectancy rises**
- **Regresses Gastil democracy index on these variables five years prior... finds significant predictive power in his panel of countries.**
- **But inequality does not seem to prevent democracy.. Does not have a significant impact on future democracy...**

Barro (1999) Inequality & Growth

- **Inequality reduces growth for values of GDP below \$2070, and then becomes positive... a one Std. Dev. Increase in the Gini affects growth by .5% per year, negatively in poor countries, positively for rich countries. Rising per capita income relaxes credit constraints...**

Barro (2007) Inequality & Growth revisited

- Inequality reduces growth developing countries, but has no effect on growth of OECD ctys. Explanation: rising per capita income relaxes credit constraints...
- Presentation

Political Economy of Growth Readings:

- Aghion, Philippe, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1998. *Growth, [Inequality, and Globalization](#): Theory, History, and Policy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Alesina and Perotti (1994) “Political Economy of Growth” *World Bank Economic Review*
- Barro, R. J. (2008). [Inequality and growth revisited](#) (wp #11). Asian Development Bank.
- Benabou (1997) “Inequality and Growth” *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*
- Rodrik, Dani (1997) “Democracy and Economic Performance” (reader)
- Rodrik, Dani (1997) “Social Conflict and Growth Collapses” (reader)