

Child labor is one of the worst consequences of severe poverty. Since early 1990s human rights advocates and the ILO have focused on the potential exploitation children in “hazardous work” and the lost potential of children who work instead of going to school. There is no single solution for ending child labor (apart from ending poverty) but Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) seem to be perfectly tailored to this task (i.e. Bolsa [Familia in Brazil](#) and [Oportunidades](#) in Mexico funded in part by the [World Bank](#)). In the absence of CCTs however, things become more complicated. As demonstrated by the fallout from the proposed Harkin Bill, preventing children from working (or “firing” them from factory jobs) does not imply they will end up in school. And as with “home schooling” in the United States or child actors in the United States it is possible to work and go to school. If making children and their families better off after an intervention to reduce child labor, the choice between banning child labor and transfer “conditional” on having kids in school becomes clear. Compensating families for lost income and additional costs when children go to school (as in [catching hope](#)). Please use [this word template](#) to .

Kabeer, Naila (2001) [The Power to Choose](#), Bangladeshi Women and Labor Market decisions in the London and Dhaka, Chapter 11, Weak winners, Powerful losers: the politics of protectionism. See also the [Interview with Professor Naila Kabeer](#) following Rana Plaza disaster (in the last 2-3 sections she discusses ILO’s better work and the relative disaffection of Bangladeshi’s in East London).

Jane Lii (New York Times, March 1995) [65 Cents an Hour -- A special report.: Week in Sweatshop Reveals Grim Conspiracy of the Poor](#)

Shahidul Alam, 1994, [Harkin bill and child workers in Bangladesh](#), Bangladesh Human Rights Network.

Power, Carla 2008 [Manufacturing the Burden of Good intentions](#), Time Magazine, June 11<sup>th</sup> 2008.

ILO-IPEC, 1999, [Fifteen examples of successful Action Programs](#), ILO Children in Hazardous Work

Terry Friel, 2004, Reuters, [Rina Kumari Sahani](#), slum girl from Siliguri India, Rock Breaker, in Bihar India,

<http://www.gdsnet.org/RinaBreakingRocksMorePictures.pdf>

UNICEF, [State of the World’s Children 2007](#)


World Bank Women’s Day 2012, NARI program : <http://go.worldbank.org/8BVK63VB50>

**LDQ-4.1 Varieties of Child labor:** a) Using Kabeer’s classification of “tag along” vs. “hard core” child workers classify by name and country the underage looking workers we encounter in Brazil, China, Brooklyn, Bangladesh and India (where child workers appear to be underage given prevailing labor laws: under 14 in BGD, under 17 in China and the U.S., etc.) Why can’t anyone be sure which of these workers are underage? b) How did the BGMEA-UNICEF/ILO/BRAC MOU attempt to help both types of child workers and their families? What is the risk in simply firing workers that look underage? c) Why don’t union leaders and city officials enforce child labor laws at the Brooklyn Chai Feng sweatshop? What laws do they enforce? Why do the mothers appreciate Madame Zheng for letting their children come to work with them? d) Why did UNICEF and the ILO intervene to stop the BGMEA fired underage looking workers? Why and how did the workers protest these firings? e) Why does Naila Kabeer and Bangladeshi human rights advocates think Senator Harkin tried to ban imports from countries using child labor? (the Harkin Bill never passed) What do you think? f) *Senator Harkin often takes credit for getting 10,000 Bangladeshi children into school: how should this boast be qualified?*

**LDQ-4.2** Rina Kumari Sahani is one of the most troubling child workers (perhaps 5 years old, breaking rocks in the hot sun). A CCT program would be great for her, but India does not have one. a) Why does Rina have to work breaking rocks in the hot sun? Do her parents care about her? How do we know? b) UNICEF has a program for when Rina is 8: the [Hammers and Homework](#) program (in BGD at least). How does this program work? Would Rina have to stop working or watching her siblings to benefit from this program?

**LDQ 4.3.** a) As of 2004, what does the Gap do when it finds child workers in its factories? Why are most of its factories “never in compliance” according to CEO Pressler? (See Power, 2008) b) A NY Times editor (perhaps not Jane Lii) call the Chai Feng sweatshop a “grim conspiracy of the poor”: a conspiracy to do what?

### Figure SA-2: Bangladesh \$1.25/day Poverty Rate



Source: World bank Povcalnet (February 2015)  
<http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalSvy.html>