The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How is the Transatlantic Debate Relevant for Further Research on the European Second Generation?

Online Publication Date: 01 September 2007
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13691830701541556
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691830701541556

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How is the Transatlantic Debate Relevant for Further Research on the European Second Generation?

Mark Thomson and Maurice Crul

This introductory paper to the special issue of JEMS on the second generation in Europe reviews some of the key themes underpinning the growing interest in the second generation, and asks what ‘integration’ actually means in contemporary debates about immigration and settlement. The authors attempt to place these debates within their specific national contexts, in particular by applying US-developed theories of second-generation integration to Europe. In this way, we build on the embryonic transatlantic dialogue about which factors potentially account for different patterns of second-generation integration in different countries. Integration, in this sense, refers both to structural aspects such as educational and labour-market status as well as to a broader and at times fuzzier concept that includes ideas of culture, ethnic or religious identity and citizenship. The paper also sets the scene for the various articles in this special issue which together illustrate the thematic breadth of European-based research on the children of immigrants. We conclude by offering two theoretical avenues for future research on ethnic minority groups and their settlement patterns.

Keywords: Second Generation; Integration; Segmented Assimilation; Ethnic Cohesion; Europe; United States
Introduction

In the last 15 years a great deal of research about the second generation has emerged in journals and books. These publications have stirred a wider theoretical debate about assimilation and integration. US scholars have dominated the international discussion, especially in terms of theoretical models used to explain the position of the second generation in society. European scholars, however, are catching up and starting to react to the theoretical notions produced within the American context. There is also a growing interest among scholars in the US to look across the Atlantic to countries where similar integration or assimilation processes are studied. In the American debate on the second generation, US-born children of Mexican and Asian immigrants play a key role. Second-generation groups in Europe are, as a whole, ethnically very different compared to those in the US. The parents of the largest groups of second-generation young people either come from ex-colonies or were recruited as labour migrants. Compared to labour migrants in the US, those in Europe are less diverse in terms of their economic background. Most, but not all, came from rural areas and had hardly any schooling.

Public debate about the second generation in Europe has taken a dramatic turn in the last five years. In the Netherlands, arguments about the failure of the country’s multicultural society have cited the relatively high number of Dutch-Moroccan students who drop out of school and the high crime rate within the Moroccan second generation. In Germany, similar concerns about the Turkish second generation have triggered a debate about the existence of a separate Gesellschaft, composed of almost 2 million Turks living in a parallel world detached from the wider German society. The riots in the banlieues in France, involving mostly Algerian and Moroccan second-generation youth, pitched the cherished Republican assimilationist model into deep crisis. The UK was profoundly shocked that British-born second-generation youth of Pakistani descent were involved in terror acts in the UK. In all these countries the Muslim identity of these groups has been played out as a significant factor in explaining the failure to integrate, especially when socio-economic indicators (such as a good education and job prospects) would usually suggest that particular individuals are integrated. In the public debate, there is a general tendency to see religion, and specifically Islam, as one of the major obstacles to integration. The integration process of non-Muslim groups, however, often shows more parallels (e.g. in terms of educational performance, labour-market position or transnational activities) than differences with Muslim groups. This selective focus of attention clearly adds to the danger of essentialising Muslims.

This brings us to the more general question about how to define integration. If it is measured simply in terms of a person’s qualifications and labour-market activity, then by what criteria do we distinguish between the majority ethnic group and ethnic minorities? We rarely, if ever, hear that sections of the indigenous population are not integrated despite their own experience of poverty and deprivation. On the flipside, we frequently overlook success stories within immigrant communities, either because
of the tendency to focus on particular sections of the population with identifiable social problems, or simply due to a lack of differentiation between distinct ethnic groups.

Integration is also about less quantifiable aspects like culture, ethnic or religious identity, citizenship and (though more problematically) race. In this way, the question of whether a person or a group is integrated often amounts to a normative judgement which varies between national contexts and over time. The reason for this variation is that integration can be understood as both an organic process, taking place—though rarely at the same time or speed—at the individual and collective levels (Alba 2005), and a process which is set in motion (or indeed set back) by key events or legislative changes. It is clear, for instance, that the terrorist bombings in New York, Madrid and London have affected how Muslims living in Europe are perceived (see, for example, Abbas 2005). Such events lead to claims that sections of society are not integrated which, far from being based on structural or socio-economic analysis, play on outward signs of difference such as religious or cultural practices, ethnicity and (less so in the second and subsequent generations) language.

This echoes the sentiment in Alba and Nee’s (2003) work that assimilation (their term) is the ‘decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences’. Put more simply, distinctions along ethnic, cultural and social lines become less relevant in public or social settings. This occurs over time as ethnic groups begin to adopt the social and cultural practices of the majority, or, more fundamentally, when the country of settlement broadens its notions of citizenship and belonging. This is not to suggest that the process of assimilation is a linear one and without difficulties. At the institutional level, changes to citizenship laws—as in Germany—occurred only after a significant period of time, whilst the headscarf debate in France persists to this day. At the level of the community, shared values and beliefs may be challenged by the cultures and religions that migrants bring with them, which then bring about reactions in the host society, ranging from curiosity through to direct racism. Both public policy and community responses to immigration clearly have the potential to affect the opportunities for migrants and their offspring to integrate. What different national contexts reveal is the extent to which ‘ethnic penalties’ exist, and are ‘passed down’ to subsequent generations of immigrants, specifically in the form of ethnic and racial discrimination (Heath and McMahon 1996).

Theories of Second-Generation Integration

The preceding discussion suggests that integration is a complex process shaped by a diverse range of factors, some of which—such as government policy and levels of racism—are usually beyond the influence of the second generation. This does not mean that we should forget the importance of agency and the role of immigrant communities themselves, as the two articles on the educational position of the second generation in Spain and Portugal in this issue show (respectively the papers by
Aparicio and by Marques et al.). For instance, it is often remarked that people migrate—not necessarily only across national borders, but also between regions within one country—to provide their children with better educational and career opportunities. The value that immigrant parents attach to education appears to vary by ethnicity (though potentially more so by social class and gender), and is one instance where intrinsic cultural values are seen to influence patterns of integration in future generations. We need to bear in mind, however, that some immigrant parents, due to poor linguistic skills in the official language of the receiving country, are—however willing—unable to offer much educational support to their children or to fully engage with the schooling system (see Crul 2000; Ennelli et al. 2005). Attributing different educational outcomes in the second generation to cultural differences alone comes with the obvious risk of ignoring more socio-economic factors. The two above-mentioned articles in this issue try to unravel these factors.

There is also a growing literature on the role of ethnic niches for the second generation. Such niches, particularly in the food and retail sectors through family-run ventures, can offer ready employment to the children of immigrants. Many immigrant children, however, will naturally aspire to greater personal and financial independence, and be reluctant to work in businesses where the wages are often low and the working hours long and unsociable. Zontini’s article in this issue on second-generation Italian families in the UK shows how family businesses influence the decisions of the second generation in relation to work and childcare.

Together, these factors have the potential to produce different integration trajectories in the second generation. Not only is the classical, linear theory of integration into mainstream society, i.e. into some kind of ‘unified core’ of common values, practices and language (Alba and Nee 1997), somewhat discredited as a prescriptive outcome of policy or practice (Brubaker 2001), but it also now appears decidedly shaky as a process. Whether these alternative paths of integration will, given time, prove to be any different from earlier patterns of second-generation integration remains very debatable for some observers (see Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). Others claim that widespread changes in society and in the economy, alongside the growing diversity of immigrants in terms of social class and nationality, have made the linear model of integration less likely to fit with the more complex reality of today (Portes and Rumbaut 2005).

New theoretical perspectives emerged in the 1990s from the United States to reflect this view, beginning with Gans’ (1992) concept of ‘second-generation decline’ and Portes and Zhou’s (1993) theory of ‘segmented assimilation’. Both ideas expressed a fair degree of pessimism for the future of some US-born immigrant youth, positing that they could face what Portes and Zhou described as ‘downward assimilation into the urban underclass’ with permanent poverty being a distinct possibility. It is argued that this scenario is more probable today, compared to the era of mainly ‘white’ European immigration to the US, because of racial and ethnic discrimination against darker-skinned people and a narrowing of labour-market opportunities for the second generation. Whereas earlier migrants and their descendants could more
confidently aspire to upward mobility within working-class jobs, the advent of today's hourglass economy—with a subsequent decline in middle-ranking posts—offers fewer opportunities or incentives to less-well educated members of the second generation. Although more historically-grounded studies on both sides of the Atlantic caution against painting a picture of seamless integration of pre-World War I immigrants and their descendants (Lucassen 2005; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001; Waldinger and Perlmann 1998), the persistence of racism and today's polarised labour market are seen as factors potentially leading to the formation of an ‘oppositional culture’ in disenchanted native-born immigrant youth, especially those who have grown up in socially-isolated and deprived neighbourhoods (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997: 986–7).

Whilst the idea that people ‘assimilate’ into more marginalised sections of society poses definitional issues about what integration actually refers to, it is useful to understand that second-generation integration may take different forms. The key point to bear in mind is where, i.e. in which social setting, integration takes place (Portes and Zhou 1993). In other words, into what section of society are young people integrating? Whereas through education and, to a lesser extent, in the workplace, there is the potential for ‘formal acculturation’ (Gans 1992) of the second generation into the mainstream, their more informal experiences outside school or work can be more significant, especially if they have been left disillusioned by poor schooling or low-paid and low-status employment. The values that we often assume are a prerequisite to integration, such as upward mobility through a good education and hard work, may not be highly prized by some members of the second generation. This situation can bring conflict within households if parental expectations of their children are not fulfilled or are opposed, and especially when immigrant parents are unable, due to poor language skills and limited knowledge of the new culture, to control how their children are integrating—a process which has been described as ‘dissonant acculturation’ (Portes 1997).

On a more optimistic note, the theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ also suggests that socio-economic advancement can and does take place but with the second generation upholding the traditions and values of the immigrant community. This juxtaposes the classical model of integration into ‘white, middle-class’ America, and argues that immigrant youth do not need to sacrifice the cultural for the economic; that is, traditional values and beliefs are no longer relegated to a position below the material and financial rewards of socio-economic advancement. Upward mobility through ethnic cohesion, as Portes and Zhou (1993) observed in the Punjabi Sikh community in northern California, gives the lie to classical assimilation theory. Despite the humble social origins of many Punjabi immigrants, and in the face of overt racial discrimination by local white residents, theirs was mainly a story of economic success. This would later be reflected in the educational success of Punjabi students who consistently outperformed their white peers at school and college but maintained, as their parents desired, few contacts with students from outside the close-knit Punjabi Sikh community. The second generation respected parental and
community values, and did not adopt, as some parents feared, any form of ‘oppositional culture’ that would have adversely affected their education (Gibson 1989).

It is clear from this example that a purely structuralist perspective only partially, and at times counter-intuitively, explains patterns of second-generation integration. The scenario of economic and educational success in the face of racism and socio-economic disadvantage poses intriguing though contentious questions (Zhou 2005). Why are some ethnic minorities performing better than others even when we control—albeit not perfectly—for ‘structure’? What are the ‘coping strategies’ adopted by different ethnic groups that could explain this? Should we be asking, as Modood (2004) has recently done, how and why ethnic minority children seem to react differently to racial discrimination? The examples of Punjabi Sikhs in California or British-Indian pupils in the UK suggest that by no means all immigrant children react by becoming demotivated, let alone by exhibiting signs of what is more loosely termed as ‘second-generation revolt’ (Waldinger and Perlmann 1998).

More nuanced answers to these questions are to be found in the dynamic interplay between structure, culture (of which ethnicity is a significant part) and personal agency. This is particularly apparent at the local level. By focusing on specific local conditions, it is possible to address concerns that structure only describes the more general, macro-level processes at work, that culture is all too easily reified, and that individual agency often appears to be neglected. One locality compared to another may well display very different patterns of second-generation integration for a variety of reasons: the quality and funding of schools, the availability of post-educational opportunities, the incidence of crime, the level and nature of familial and community support networks, the degree of ethnic cohesion and so on. All these variables will potentially affect how younger residents in a particular area develop and adapt their personal aspirations and future expectations.

Zhou (2005), for example, illustrates how the interplay of cultural and structural factors at the local level can affect mobility patterns. She distinguishes between ethnic enclaves and underclass ghettos in the US, both of which nonetheless display high levels of segregation by ethnicity, race and social class, and suffer from poverty, poor housing and few highly-paid jobs. The distinction lies in the strength of the social ties and networks in ethnic enclaves that facilitate social organisation and are conducive to upward mobility, and which appear much weaker in ghettos. Zhou’s study of New York’s Chinatown portrays a community with a strong sense of its ethnic identity, formed through the community’s various economic, civic and religious organisations. Some of these are a response to specific structural needs of the residents (e.g. for employment, information and advice), others enhance the community’s social ties and help to establish social norms (e.g. that education is highly valued). These ties, what Putnam (1995; Putnam 2000) termed linking ties, may cut across social class and provide access to resources that improve the opportunities for socio-economic mobility.
The Chinatown study echoes Zhou’s earlier work with Portes on ethnic cohesion as an alternative route to upward mobility, but here she develops the idea of ‘ethnicity as social capital’ (Portes and Zhou 1993). In other words, ethnicity interacts with structure to help explain how and why some localities develop the strong social ties and networks that make up social capital, whilst other localities do not, despite a common lack of financial or human capital. This argument—that some communities are at the same time rich in one form of capital, but poor in another—is clearly reminiscent of work by Bourdieu (1997) on different forms of social capital. Even more pertinent to our discussion on the mobility patterns of the second generation, though, is the concept that one form of capital can lead to the creation or enhancement of another; e.g. that social capital is translated into the personal skills and abilities that make up human capital, especially when a community prioritises the education of future generations (Coleman 1988).

Yet, social capital is by no means uniformly experienced in a positive way. For some, a community’s close social ties and networks can represent limitations on their personal freedom, pressures to conform, and an overbearing form of control on a person’s future plans and ambitions. Dissent from social norms can entail isolation from family and friends, not to mention stigmatisation by other community members. For those who find themselves on the outside of a tightly-knit community, social capital often represents a form of social exclusion or even discrimination (see Crul and Vermeulen 2003a; Portes 1988: 15–18).

This largely American theoretical debate about the integration of the second generation seems to have had a persistent blind spot for the importance of the national context in which the second generation is trying to move forward. In the American debate on the second generation, the emphasis has been on comparing different ethnic groups in the same national context (for some of the most important studies, see Kasinitz et al. 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 1996, 2001). There have been comparatively few studies in which the integration of American children of immigrants is compared with the integration of children of immigrants in other countries (exceptions are the studies by Alba 2005; Faist 1995; Mollenkopf 2000). North American researchers, as Reitz (2002: 8–9) argues, have only recently started to pay more attention to the importance of the national context in which immigrants and their children live and work.

The importance of the national context for integration pathways has received more attention in Europe (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b; Doomernik 1998; Eldering and Kloprogge 1989; Fase 1994; Heckmann et al. 2001; Mahnig 1998). That research in Europe is more cross-national is understandable given the fact that there are many countries close to each other which, although economically linked, are structured very differently, as we outline below. It is therefore more obvious to look at the effects of these differences in the European context. One of the most important European contributions to the international theoretical debate on integration has been to bring in the national context as an important factor of integration.
In the literature two theoretical approaches have been put forward to explain differences in integration patterns between countries: the citizenship approach (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 2003; Joppke 1999) and the institutional approach (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a; Crul and Vermeulen 2006). The first explains variations which are due to differences in national models of integration. National models of integration transmit ‘national’ ideas, norms and values that shape the interaction (in both ideological and legislative terms) with newcomers and their children. The assumption is that this will also have a substantial effect on the socio-economic position of immigrants and their children.

In a special issue of the *International Migration Review* on the second generation in six European countries, Crul and Vermeulen (2003b) showed that there is no clear-cut effect of national models of integration on the socio-economic integration of the second generation. National integration models clearly have an effect on naturalisation rates and most probably also on identity formation among the second generation (Heckmann et al. 2001; Kaya and Kentel 2005). However, educational and labour-market positions of the second generation seem not to be affected in the same unequivocal way by national models of integration.

Crul and Vermeulen (2003b) then proceed to show that national variations in institutional arrangements, as opposed to distinct national models of integration, offer better explanations for different patterns of second-generation integration across Europe. Differences in educational systems (in terms of the age at which children must begin school, the number of contact hours in primary school, and the importance of early or late selection in secondary education) are a key influence. Similarly, the different ways in which the transition to the labour market is formalised are important, especially when the role of apprenticeship schemes is taken into account (cf. Crul and Schneider 2007; Faist 1995). This ‘institutional approach’ to the process of integration highlights the often-overlooked role of institutions. Instead of focusing on immigrant groups themselves, this approach turns the spotlight on the societal context.

The European Second Generation

How do the theories discussed in the section above, developed mainly by US-based scholars, translate into the European context? Recent research on ethnic groups in Europe has drawn upon the theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ to help describe the integration and mobility patterns of the European second generation (Crul and Vermeulen 2003b). Particular focus has been on the theory’s two alternative ‘modes of incorporation’: downward assimilation, and upward mobility through ethnic cohesion. In some ways, this reflects the growing disparity between, on the one hand, immigrant youth who are performing well, and, on the other, the relatively high numbers dropping out of school and failing to find secure employment. In the UK, British Chinese and Indian children (some belonging to the third generation) have consistently performed better than British Whites at school, and in marked contrast,
for example, to the high drop-out rate amongst children from London’s Kurdish- and Turkish-speaking communities (Enneli et al. 2005; Saggar 2004). Poorer levels of education and higher drop-out rates appear to be a general characteristic of the Turkish second generation in Europe, although figures do conceal some undoubted success stories. In Germany, Turkish youth are statistically much less likely to graduate from the higher educational streams than native Germans, whilst in France, 46 per cent of the Turkish second generation left school in 1999 without any diplomas, against 24 per cent of the total population (Simon 2003: 1105; Worbs 2003).

Ethnic minority groups in Europe, such as the Turks, disproportionately reside in more deprived areas where schools are more likely to have fewer resources, more disciplinary issues, and higher staff turnover. This echoes some of the notions in the downward mobility variant in the segmented assimilation theory. The residential areas in European cities are, however, not comparable in scale or in terms of their social problems with US ghettos, where the potential for downward assimilation is seen as greatest (Portes and Zhou 1993). A second important factor, which results in a school-based concentration of children of immigrants, is formal and informal tracking. This is not simply a question of the quality of education, as suggested above, but about how and when pupils are streamed in schools into higher- or lower-ability groups. This means that, in some countries, children of immigrants are already selected out to vocational education at a young age, with the result that they go to schools where the majority of pupils is of immigrant background (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a: 977; Worbs 2003). Marginalisation, however, can also occur in a mixed surrounding. Research comparing the experiences of Afro-Caribbean and South Asian pupils in the UK has noted that teachers are more disciplinary with, and less expectant of, Black (male) students, who are seen as more disruptive and less willing to learn than their Indian or Pakistani peers (Gillborn 1997; Reynolds 2005).

The American concept of downward assimilation is nonetheless too striking in its pessimism and too definitive in its claim that downward assimilation is a permanent feature of certain immigrant communities. Even those children of some ethnic groups, like second-generation Turks, who are considered to do less well than other children of ethnic groups, are still upwardly mobile compared to their parents. The problematic behaviour of boys in at-risk groups is often a feature of the in-between (or 1.5) generation, and is less an issue in the second generation. As time passes, and younger generations are born, these behavioural difficulties seem to lessen.

Furthermore the data show that it is not just simply a case of one ethnic group outperforming another. There are also signs of polarisation within ethnic groups that need to be explained by reference to a range of more clearly cultural or structural factors. Indeed, criticism of the theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ is that it fails to pay sufficient attention to internal differences within ethnic groups (Crul and Vermeulen 2003a). Let us give two examples.

First, there is a tendency to speak of ethnic groups as homogenous groups, as many originally arrived as labour migrants from the same regions and even villages. This
fails, however, to recognise better-educated professionals who sometimes came for study reasons or because of political persecution (Mehmet Ali 2001). It also fails to bring to light clear ethnic and religious differences within migrant communities in Europe, like Syrian Christians or Kurds.

Second, there are clear internal differences along gender lines. Whereas some research has pointed to a positive relationship between high levels of ethnic cohesion and educational success, other research has flagged up cases where ethnic cohesion is seen to adversely affect the education of some female students. In contrast to the prevailing opinion in the Indo-Surinamese community in the Netherlands that educational success lends high social status to the family unit (van Niekerk 2004), the Dutch-Turkish community have traditionally placed less value on the schooling of their daughters. Daughters of Turkish origin were expected to marry at an early age in the belief that an early marriage would ward off gossip (de Vries 1990) and bring them status in the community back home (when close relatives in Turkey send their sons to Europe to be married). But again we see that these traditional gender roles are changing in the younger generations, and that earlier patterns of integration need not be a permanent feature of particular ethnic groups (Crul and Doomernik 2003).

The Articles in this Special Issue

Whilst the aforementioned IMR special issue edited by Crul and Vermeulen (2003) focused primarily on the structural integration of the second generation in Europe, relatively little attention was given to citizenship, identity issues or transnationalism. In this special issue, we fill some of these gaps. The emphasis on the position in education and the labour market has understandably dominated the discussion about the second generation so far. This applies both to the US and to Europe. We are convinced that the study of other topics (citizenship, identity formation and transnationalism) will help formulate new ideas about the interplay between cultural integration, identity formation and the structural integration of the second generation.

Most publications in Europe have so far concentrated on the children of labour migrants. Relatively little attention has been given to the children of ex-colonial migrants. As some of the following articles show, the ex-colonial relationship always brings in a complicated amalgam of both positive and negative influential factors. Long-established racial stereotypes are the obvious negative factor (see the article by Marques et al.), but a shared language, educational system and history could potentially be positive factors for integration (see the article by van Niekerk). These are obvious factors in the success of the British-born Hong Kong Chinese in the UK and the Surinamese in the Netherlands.

The Chinese represent a success story in many countries, but as David Parker and Miri Song argue in the following paper in this issue, a sense of belonging to the new country does not necessarily follow from high achievement in education and the labour market. These authors show how, for the British-born Chinese, the Internet
functions as an important place for identity production in the UK. The term *reflexive racialisation* is used to describe how the British-born Chinese negotiate their belonging and social location in British society in a situation of ongoing racial discrimination. The adjective ‘reflexive’ is used to refer to the interaction with the host society and the self-questioning within the group in the Internet debates.

Mies van Niekerk then addresses two post-colonial second-generation groups: the Surinamese and the Antilleans in the Netherlands. Generally speaking, the social position of immigrant groups advances as their period of residence increases. This, however, may not always be the case for post-colonial immigrants and their children. Migration from former colonies often starts as an elite migration and ends up as mass migration. It is the reflection of the colonial bonds and of the changing relationship of a colonised territory with its metropole. Over time we therefore see a decline in the position of these particular second-generation groups in the Netherlands. This raises important questions about the internal diversity of communities that are often overlooked.

The debate on transnationalism has primarily focused on the first generation. Susanne Wessendorf looks at what she calls an extreme case of transnationalism among the Italian second generation in Switzerland, which she has coined ‘roots migration’—migration to the parents’ homeland. She describes in a revealing way how the harsh structural reality in southern Italian small towns and villages shatters the idealised picture of the imagined homeland for many roots migrants. For some, relocating to southern Italy seems almost as difficult as their parents’ migration to Switzerland some 40–50 years ago, especially for those young women who are caught in what they feel is a situation of overarching social control. The gendered geographies of power in southern Italy make roots migration a very different experience for men and women.

Elisabetta Zontini then describes how particular values and norms get transmitted and transformed across generations in Italian immigrant families in the UK. She shows that the second generation is not necessarily moving from the traditional to the modern. This puzzling result is unravelled in her article. The change is not generated by the adoption of the values of the receiving society nor by the rejection of their parents’ values. As second-generation women are economically more independent than their mothers, they have the option of combining care tasks and work where their mothers did not have this choice. Because of their experience as children growing up in a household where both parents were working, they want to be there for the children. At the same time they want to move away from the hierarchical relationship that was characteristic of their own upbringing, and stress the open relationship they have with their children.

Rosita Fibbi and her co-authors look at a subject which has so far gained little attention—the effect of citizenship on the position of children of immigrants in Switzerland. Conditions for acquiring Swiss citizenship are the most stringent in Europe. Citizenship is usually considered to be of major importance for participation in society, and Fibbi et al. show that there are considerable effects of citizenship even
when conditions (same generation and ethnic group) are constant. Their article is an important input into the debate about citizenship and its effects on integration. It also shows that, if the naturalised are taken out of the comparison (because of the use of nationality as a criterion), this leads to a serious misrepresentation of the position of immigrant groups and their children.

Next, Margarida Marques and her co-authors discuss issues of school and diversity in Portugal. They show that the outcomes of children of immigrants in school are very diverse. The ethnic groups that do not possess the necessary cultural or social capital to do well in education have a hard time integrating into the Portuguese school system. The authors develop the argument of the weak state as an explanation for this situation. New support programmes have been developed but either the effects are not (yet) visible or they do not have the foreseen results.

Finally, Rosa Aparicio presents results from one of the first Spanish research projects on the in-between and second generations. Her paper looks primarily at the educational and labour-market positions of the three most important migrant groups in Spain: Moroccans, Dominicans and Peruvians. Aparicio tests some of the hypotheses of the segmented assimilation model. Her findings, somewhat counter-intuitively, show that the most assimilated group (the Peruvians) shows the least intergenerational mobility. In contrast, the group that is most distant from native Spaniards in terms of language, culture and religion (the Moroccans) shows the strongest intergenerational mobility but remains highly discriminated against. This contribution to the special issue gives a lot of food for thought in the theoretical debate about the different paths that second-generation youth follow.

Theoretical Notions for Further Research on the Second Generation in Europe

Studies on the European second generation offer some important contrasts with US-based research and theories. Translating the concept of downward mobility into the European context suffers on empirical grounds, as the theory itself appears very much dependent on particular structural features of the US economy and society (Alba 2005: 42), whilst the idea of upward mobility through ethnic cohesion fails to acknowledge that a group’s cohesion can be oppressive for some. Furthermore, it seems that upward mobility through ethnic cohesion remains a limited phenomenon in the European context. Does this, as Crul and Vermeulen (2003a: 983) ask, represent a return to the more classical, linear model of assimilation? Or does it suggest that the very definition of ethnic cohesion needs to be more nuanced to take into account the internal differences and changes in the attitudes and values that are routinely attributed to the ‘same’ ethnic group? General trends do, nonetheless, indicate that there is social mobility across generations in Europe. In other words, most children of immigrants are better educated and find more skilled employment than their parents.

In conclusion, we would like to put forward two theoretical approaches that seem to hold promise for studying the second generation in Europe. The first approach
looks at the importance of the national context. The second elaborates the theoretical notion of ‘blurred’ and ‘bright’ boundaries developed by Richard Alba (2005).

It is clear from research in Europe that different patterns of social mobility in the European second generation exist, and, compared to the one-nation setting of much US-based research on the second generation (cf. Alba 2005), these may be explained with reference to differences in the national setting. Analysis of secondary national data suggests that national contexts have a profound impact (see Crul and Vermeulen 2003b). National contexts vary widely in the types of opportunity they offer to the second generation. The institutional setting, both in terms of general policies (e.g. the way the educational system works), as well as targeted policies (see the articles by Marques et al. and by Aparicio), seems to be important for the different outcomes. 6

The second promising conceptual framework for research on the integration of the second generation has been developed by Alba (2005), who speaks of ‘bright’ and ‘blurred’ boundaries which vary in their intensity across different nation-states. ‘Bright’ boundaries represent sharper divisions between ethnic groups which, especially for a community as a whole, are much more difficult to cross than the more malleable, less divisive ‘blurred’ boundaries. The author conceptualises their varying forms in terms of citizenship, religion, race and language, and finds that second-generation Mexicans in the US, North Africans in France and Turks in Germany experience them in sometimes quite different ways. Until recent legislative amendments in Germany came into force, acquisition of citizenship was much more restrictive than in France and the US, where the *jus soli* principle of birthright citizenship (though more qualified in the French case) makes the boundary between different ethnic groups much more blurred. The issue of language, despite high levels of second-generation fluency in the majority tongue, leads to more ambiguous conclusions when we consider that Arabic (or even Berber) in France and Turkish in Germany are much less recognised in public life (e.g. in school lessons or on public signs) than is Spanish in the US. Boundaries appear to be brightest where racism—despite the concept of race being anathema to official thinking in France and Germany—persists as a social problem, and where the place of Islam in European societies at times sits uncomfortably alongside its predominantly Christian heritage. Official secularism in France has meant that places of worship for Muslims are largely makeshift, whilst public funding, unavailable for new religious constructions, is spent on maintaining the country’s national heritage, including many Christian buildings (Baubérot 2000; Laurance 2001). In the UK, it is claimed that some employers are reluctant to employ more devout Muslims, for example women who wear the *Hijab* or people who would like to observe religious rituals such as prayers in the workplace (Ahmad et al. 2003: 32–3).

The type and existence of boundaries clearly affect the process of identity formation in the second generation. Citizenship acts as a powerful tool of inclusion, and as a concrete sign of belonging to the society in which ethnic groups settle, by endowing them with rights equal to those of the indigenous population. The second generation will, as citizens, negotiate their own identity with reference to the national
setting (see Hussain and Bagguley 2005), creating new, hyphenated identities—such as British-Chinese or Dutch-Moroccan—which become part of common discourse. Where more restrictive laws on citizenship exist, however, a discourse of exclusion is facilitated. Questions of national identity are seen to be formulated much more narrowly and with greater emphasis on common ethnicity (or *jus sanguinis*). The inability of sections of society in Italy, for example, to conceive of an Italian who is black, despite many of the black second generation holding Italian citizenship, reflects this situation—self-definition as Italian, or using a hyphenated identity such as African-Italian, does not easily conform to an accepted (or indeed acceptable) image of the national identity in Italy (Andall 2002).

In a more prosaic sense, we are reminded of an emerging body of research on second-generation transnationalism and how the children of immigrants relate to the parental homeland (see, for instance, Carvalho 2005; Christou and King 2006; Levitt and Waters 2002). The character and significance of these links to the homeland again depend very much on contextual factors such as the socio-economic status of parents, pressures on children to integrate or be ‘transnational’ (though not necessarily mutually exclusive), intergenerational conflict within families and ethnic groups, as well as second-generation experiences with wider society (Morawska 2003). In its ultimate form, second-generation transnationalism will involve a ‘return home’, as Wessendorf discusses in this issue.

**Acknowledgements**

This paper, and the special issue of *JEMS*, arise out of a series of workshops organised under the IMISCOE Network of Excellence (‘International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe’) funded under the EU’s Sixth Framework Programme. Specifically the workshops—held at the University of Sussex in April 2005, at the University of Amsterdam in March 2006 and at the University of Osnabrück in September 2006—were part of the activity of the C8 research cluster on ‘Gender, Age and Generations’, and were co-sponsored under the TIES project (‘The Integration of the European Second Generation’), directed by Maurice Crul.

**Notes**

[1] Although this is not to deny that academic and scientific debate about the second generation has taken place within Europe, particularly in the fields of psychology and pedagogy, albeit often not in the English language.

[2] We define the second generation as children born in the host country of one or more immigrant parents or those who arrived before primary-school age.

[3] One example of an initiative for transatlantic collaboration on this topic is the Children of Immigrants in School (CIS) project: http://mumford.albany.edu/schools/index.htm.

[4] When referring to the indigenous population, the term ‘social exclusion’ is often preferred.

[5] This pessimistic outlook for people residing in ‘ghettos’ has been the source of some recent criticism. Waldinger and his co-authors (2007) argue that second-generation Mexicans,
despite gloomy predictions to the contrary, are now integrating into ‘working-class’ America—another form of second-generation integration.

This research idea will be further developed in the TIES project. TIES— ‘The Integration of the European Second Generation’— is an ongoing project (2005–09) which looks at the integration of the Turkish, Moroccan and ex-Yugoslavian second generation in eight European countries. See www.imiscoe.org/ties for more information.

References


